Doe v. McFadden joins a growing series of cases that underscore what has been described as a nationwide pattern of political repression and anti-Muslim sentiment. Far from an isolated incident, Doe’s allegations mirror a series of similar lawsuits across the country. Over the past decade, several law enforcement agencies have been sued over claims that officers forced Muslim women to remove their hijabs—a religious head covering—during police interactions. 

In response to constitutional challenges, law enforcement agencies often defend the removal of religious head coverings during booking by invoking broad claims of “security” or “safety.” Legal challenges to these practices generally proceed under two overlapping frameworks: the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which affords heightened protection to the religious exercise of individuals in government custody. 

For the women subjected to this practice, wearing a hijab is an expression of sincerely held religious beliefs; being seen without it, some describe, is akin to being seen naked. Forcibly removing a hijab can leave them feeling distressed, exposed, and fearful of reputational harm if she is seen uncovered. This is not merely a hypothetical concern; it is what Doe alleges occurred during her interaction with the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office.  

Background 

In the aftermath of a protest outside a city council meeting in Charlotte, North Carolina, the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department issued a warrant for Jane Doe’s arrest, asserting violation of a noise ordinance and impeding traffic. Doe voluntarily turned herself in at the Mecklenburg County Detention Center, wearing her hijab and corresponding modest clothing, as aligned with her religious beliefs.  

After informing the arresting officers that she is Muslim, and that, consistent with her beliefs, she cannot be seen without modest clothing and a hijab by men outside her immediate family, they proceeded to allow a female officer to search Doe. Despite being aware of her beliefs, the female officer lifted Doe’s shirt in plain view of male officers and other detainees.  

The female officer then informed Doe that she would have to remove her hijab to take her booking photo, and that she would not be permitted to put it back on afterward. Again, Doe restated her religious beliefs and explained the shame and humiliation that would come to her, her family, friends, and male community members if the male individuals present were to see her without her hijab. 

Despite Doe’s earnest explanations, the female officer continued to insist that she remove her hijab. Overwhelmed with fear of the alternatives if she continued to refuse, Doe finally relented. Mecklenburg County Sheriff Deputies photographed Doe without her hijab and uploaded the photograph to their database. Throughout the rest of the process—booking, appearing before the magistrate, and waiting in a holding cell—Doe was left without her hijab in the presence of many male detainees and officers. 

In her lawsuit against Sheriff Garry McFadden of the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office and two unnamed officers, Doe alleged that the officers violated her right to free exercise of religion and due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which requires government officials to accommodate the sincerely held religious beliefs of people in jail and prison, absent a compelling governmental interest requiring non-accommodation.  

Sheriff McFadden’s practices, Doe stated in her complaint, were not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest. Other law enforcement and government agencies, such as the United States Department of State and the State of New York Department of Correctional Services, maintain policies recognizing that a clear photograph of an individual’s face is sufficient for identification, even when the individual is wearing a religious head covering. The Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office could have adopted the same approach by allowing Doe to wear her hijab in the booking photograph, provided her face remained visible, but instead declined to do so, failing to use the least restrictive means available to fulfill their objective. 

Doe moved for a preliminary injunction ordering the Government to: (1) destroy Doe’s booking photographs without her hijab, as well as all security footage of her without her hijab in the facility; (2) take every step to destroy all copies of her booking photograph and any associated security footage, including from other agency’s databases; and (3) implement a policy change to prohibit officers and staff from taking photographs of Muslim women without their hijab.  

Outcome 

Although the matter was eventually settled outside of court, Doe v. McFadden is no less significant. In the settlement, aided in part by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office agreed to fulfill Doe’s requested course of conduct—taking steps to destroy Doe’s photograph from their database—and issued in a new set of policies regarding the treatment of individuals who wear religious head coverings.  

The policies state: 

• Individuals in custody at Mecklenburg County Detention Center will be informed of their right to request religious head covering accommodations upon intake. 

• Photographs will not be taken of an individual in custody without their religious head covering absent a compelling penological or law enforcement-related reason to do such.  

• When a photograph must be taken without the religious head covering, the photograph must be taken in the least restrictive manner possible, including, without limitation, in private and by staff of the same gender as an individual in custody.  

• Any photograph taken of an individual in custody without their religious head covering will not be published or made public and will only be shared with other law enforcement agencies for identification purposes or following a lawful court order. 

• An individual in custody, absent compelling reasons to hold otherwise, shall be allowed to wear their religious head covering throughout the facility.  

On a Bigger Scale 

Although Doe v. McFadden concluded in a settlement, its significance should not be understated. Doe’s experience was not an isolated incident. The repeated filing of similar lawsuits across multiple jurisdictions points to a deeper constitutional problem. When the same conflict arises under standard booking procedures in different states, it is indicative of a structural failure to account for religious accommodation in routine law enforcement procedures. 

In this respect, Doe’s case reflects a broader pattern in which law enforcement agencies fail to respect Muslim women’s sincerely held religious beliefs. The policy changes adopted by the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Office demonstrate that such accommodations are both constitutionally required and practically workable. Yet, the large number of similar lawsuits nationwide—including in California, New York, Tennessee, and Virginia—indicates that many agencies act only after litigation forces reform. Unless religious accommodation is consistently recognized and embedded into policy as a constitutional duty, Muslim women will continue to bear the burden of defending their dignity, privacy, and religious freedom.  

Faith Gray 

Class of 2027, Staff Member