Silencing Miranda

What happens when someone’s Miranda rights are violated? Who is held accountable?

These are questions that the United States’ Supreme Court (“Supreme Court” or “Court”) has left unanswered following its ruling in Vega v. Tekoh. At issue in this case was whether a violation of Miranda could be the basis for a Section 1983 claim. Here, Deputy Vega (“Vega”) interrogated Tekoh without providing a Miranda warning—a violation of Miranda v. Arizona. Tekoh was then prosecuted, and the un-Mirandized statement was entered into evidence against him. The jury found Tekoh not guilty, and he filed a Section 1983 suit against Vega.

Section 1983 provides a civil action for the deprivation of a civil right. The claim can be brought against any federal or state official who uses their position to interfere with the constitutional or statutory rights of any citizen of the United States or other person in the United States. Section 1983 itself is not a substantive right but is meant to provide redress for those who have had their federal rights violated. Tekoh claimed that his Fifth Amendment right, against self-incrimination, was violated when Vega took his statement without providing a Miranda warning.

At trial for Tekoh’s Section 1983 claim, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Vega, finding that Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment right had not been violated. Tekoh appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (“Ninth Circuit”).

The Ninth Circuit held that the use of Tekoh’s un-Mirandized statement was a valid basis for a claim under Section 1983. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it had repeatedly said Miranda created prophylactic rules—rules designed to proactively prevent constitutional violations—and therefore that violation of Miranda did not necessarily equate to a constitutional violation. However, the Court believed the Supreme Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States (holding that Miranda is a constitutional right) “made clear that the right of a criminal defendant against having an un-Mirandized statement introduced in the prosecution’s case in chief is indeed a right secured by the Constitution.” Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Tekoh could establish a violation of his Fifth Amendment right simply by showing that Miranda had been violated and remanded the case for a new trial.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, framing the question as “whether a plaintiff may sue a police officer under Rev. Stat. Sec. 1979, 42 U. S. C. Sec. 1983, based on the alleged improper admission of an “un-Mirandized” statement in a criminal prosecution.”

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its reasoning. The majority primarily relied on Dickerson v. United States, viewing it as holding that while Miranda was a constitutional rule and cannot be overruled by statute, a violation of Miranda did not equate to an outright violation of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, a weighing of the benefits and costs of expanding Miranda was necessary.  

The Court reasoned that “while the benefits of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims under Section 1983 would be slight, the costs would be substantial.” The majority believed allowing Section 1983 claims for Miranda violations added little value to the deterrent value of Miranda and outlined four substantial costs of allowing such claims. First, “judicial economy” would be hampered. Second, allowing the re-adjudication of already resolved factual matters would undercut “strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions” when looking at the same set of facts. Third, “unnecessary friction” could result between the federal and state court systems if the federal court had to hear Section 1983 claims regarding legal and factual matters that were already settled in state court. Lastly, allowing Section 1983 claims based on Miranda would create significant procedural issues. The majority, weighing the costs and benefits, held that extending Miranda to be a basis for a Section 1983 claim was unwarranted and that “the exclusion of unwarned statements should be a complete and sufficient remedy,” but this is the exact remedy that Tekoh was denied in his criminal trial.

The dissent frames the question as whether Miranda rights are a right “secured by the Constitution” within the meaning of Section 1983. Section 1983 defines, “a “right[]” as anything that creates specific “obligations binding on [a] governmental unit” that an individual may ask the judiciary to enforce.” In answering this question, the dissent, like the majority, relies on Dickerson, and its heavy emphasis that Miranda is a “constitutional rule.”

Dickerson holds that Miranda is a constitutional rule and says so in no uncertain terms. While emphasizing repeatedly that Miranda is a constitutional rule, Dickerson also holds that Miranda cannot be overturned by any legislation. Miranda can only be replaced by legislation that is “at least as effective.” The majority accepts that Miranda is a constitutional rule, but without acknowledging Miranda warnings as a constitutional right—just as safeguards put in place to secure other rights. However, Section 1983 does not ask about that purpose of the law but asks whether “a right secured by the Constitution” was violated. Thus, the majority’s reliance on Dickerson to conclude that a violation of Miranda cannot be the basis for a Section 1983 claim is illogical when Dickerson makes it clear that Miranda is a “a right secured by the Constitution” that cannot be overruled by just any legislation and is binding on the States under the Supremacy Clause.          

Vega severely limits redress of Miranda violations, making the exclusion of the statement the only redress. However, as this case demonstrates, there are no longer any other options when such redress is denied. The ACLU described this decision as “the Court further widen[ing] the gaps between the guarantees found in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and the people’s ability to hold government officials accountable for violating them.”

After Vega, police are effectively not required to give Miranda warnings anymore, because failure to do carries almost no weight. Mitchell S. Jackson said it best in saying, “taking away the reminder of this particular right is tantamount to taking away the right itself.”

Deonta Woods

Deonta Woods is a member of the University of North Carolina School of Law’s class of 2024 and serves as a Content Editor for Volume 4 of the North Carolina Civil Rights Law Review.