{"id":816,"date":"2012-06-30T21:47:55","date_gmt":"2012-06-30T21:47:55","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ncjolt.org\/\/?p=816"},"modified":"2020-06-04T20:54:08","modified_gmt":"2020-06-04T20:54:08","slug":"in-depth-look-tweeting-at-the-office-the-dangers-of-mixing-electronic-social-media-with-workplace-activity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/in-depth-look-tweeting-at-the-office-the-dangers-of-mixing-electronic-social-media-with-workplace-activity\/","title":{"rendered":"In-Depth Look: "Tweeting" at the Office: The Dangers of Mixing Electronic Social Media with Workplace Activity"},"content":{"rendered":"
Monday, March 26th 2012 by\u00a0Tyler Hill<\/strong><\/div>\n
\u00a0<\/div>\n
Abstract<\/strong><\/div>\n
\n\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong>The advent of social media in the workplace has triggered a host of newfound legal ambiguities that most recently have been illuminated in\u00a0Phonedog v. Kravitz<\/em>, a case that addresses the issue of who bears property rights in a\u00a0Twitter<\/em>\u00a0account that was operated by an employee, yet for the use of that employee\u2019s business.\u00a0 Upon turning to Intellectual Property law and analogizing Twitter accounts to other online social media outlets such as\u00a0Linkedin<\/em>, this analysis argues that the purpose for which an online social media account was opened for is the driving factor in resolving the ownership debate.\u00a0 Furthermore, in response to the trade secrets claim brought in\u00a0Phonedog<\/em>, it is argued that social media account assets such as Twitter \u201cfollowers\u201d necessarily cannot constitute trade secrets when made viewable on the worldwide web.<\/p>\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n

Social media accounts have evolved into a forum for companies to use to recruit and interact with clients and prospective customers.\u00a0 As a result, the ownership rights over social network tools such as\u00a0Twitter<\/em>and\u00a0Facebook<\/em>[1]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0accounts have triggered previously unrealized legal significance.\u00a0 Specifically, who bears a property interest in a social media account that was used by an employee of a Limited Liability Company (LLC) for that corporate entity\u2019s business purpose, when that employee departs from the company?
\nThe U.S. District Court of Northern California faces this issue in\u00a0PhoneDog v. Kravitz<\/em>,[2]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0a case where Phonedog Media LLC (\u201cPhonedog\u201d), a mobile phone retailer, sued Mr. Noah Kravitz, a former employee of Phonedog, over ownership rights of a Twitter account after he left the company.[3]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Central to Phonedog\u2019s allegations stand two issues: i.) Who bears a property interest in a social media account that was managed by an employee of an LLC, but was used for business purposes?\u00a0 ii) Do social media account assets such as Twitter followers constitute a trade secret?<\/p>\n

II. Ownership Rights Over Social Media Accounts<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The\u00a0underlying<\/em>\u00a0purpose<\/em>\u00a0for which the social media account was created is the determinative factor for resolving the ownership question.[4]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 Accordingly, since the Twitter account was opened for the purpose of furthering the business objectives of Phonedog LLC, Phonedog is the bona fide owner of the account.
\nUltimately, Mr. Kravitz responds to the \u201cpurpose\u201d argument by stating that he used the Twitter account for both business as well as personal uses.[5]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0 As logic dictates, however, subsequent use of a tool (here, a social media account) cannot alter the purpose for which that tool was originally created.\u00a0 To do so would mean conflating \u201cpurpose\u201d with \u201cuse.\u201d<\/p>\n

III. Trade Secrets<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Phonedog also alleges that Twitter followers are trade secrets, which Mr. Kravitz misappropriated by continuing to use the account following his departure from the company.[6]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0In order for information to constitute a trade secret, it must derive independent economic value by virtue of not being known by the general public.[7]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>
\nSimilar to client lists, Twitter followers can bear value in the sense that they give rise to business opportunities.\u00a0 However, unlike client contacts which are tucked safely away in rolodexes, Twitter followers are available for Twitter users to casually view.\u00a0 In other words, Mr. Kravtiz\u2019s Twitter followers are made known to the general public, and thus cannot be trade secrets.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For the reasons stated, Phonedog stands likely to be awarded ownership rights over the Twitter account since it was created for the purpose of advancing the company\u2019s interests.\u00a0 Nevertheless, the followers on that Account do not constitute trade secrets because they are made knowable to the general public.\u00a0 Most importantly, for the corporate onlookers hoping to avoid such legal disputes, companies should establish corporate policies that clearly state that any social media accounts used at the workplace on behalf of the company are property of the business, not its user.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n
\n
\n[1]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Twitter\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0Facebook<\/em>\u00a0are both user-interactive social network websites that help to connect people through the worldwide web.\u00a0 Twitter defines itself as a \u201creal-time information network,\u201d which connects Twitter users with \u201csmall bursts of information called Tweets.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0See\u00a0<\/em>Twitter,\u00a0About Twitter<\/em>\u00a0(last visited Jan. 15, 2012),\u00a0http:\/\/twitter.com\/about<\/a>\u00a0[hereinafter\u00a0Twitter<\/em>].\u00a0 Similarly, Facebook purports its function to be to \u201chelp[] you connect and share with the people in your life.\u201d\u00a0See\u00a0<\/em>Facebook,\u00a0About Facebook<\/em>\u00a0(last visited Jan. 15, 2012),\u00a0http:\/\/www.facebook.com\/facebook<\/a>\u00a0[hereinafter\u00a0Facebook<\/em>].\n<\/div>\n
\n[2]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a02011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).<\/a>\n<\/div>\n
\n[3]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Id<\/em><\/a>.\n<\/div>\n
\n[4]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Timothy McCormack,\u00a0What Companies and Employees Need to Know About Its Social Media Assets Like Twitter, Facebook, Google+<\/em>, SeattlePi (Jan. 5, 2012 at 10:14AM),http:\/\/blog.seattlepi.com\/timothymccormack\/2012\/01\/05\/copyright-cow-comments-of-phonedog-case\/<\/a>.\n<\/div>\n
\n[5]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0McCormack,\u00a0supra\u00a0<\/em>note 16 (\u201cMr. Kravitz told CNN that he opened the account, linked it to his personal e-mail address and maintained it himself while tweeting both personal and professional things throughout his employment with PhoneDog, including links to his own articles and colleagues\u2019 articles, as well as tweets about sports, arts, and food.\u201d).\n<\/div>\n
\n[6]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Phonedog<\/em>, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129229 at 15-20.\n<\/div>\n
\n[7]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Cal Civ Code \u00a7 3426.1, sec. d 1-2 (Deering 2012).\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Monday, March 26th 2012 by\u00a0Tyler Hill \u00a0 Abstract \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The advent of social media in the workplace has triggered a host of newfound legal ambiguities that most recently have been illuminated in\u00a0Phonedog v. Kravitz, a case that addresses the issue of who bears property rights in a\u00a0Twitter\u00a0account that was operated by an employee, yet for the …<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[51],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/816"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=816"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/816\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7710,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/816\/revisions\/7710"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=816"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=816"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=816"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}