{"id":6541,"date":"2020-01-16T11:36:46","date_gmt":"2020-01-16T15:36:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ncjolt.org\/?p=6541"},"modified":"2020-06-04T20:52:23","modified_gmt":"2020-06-04T20:52:23","slug":"decrypting-apples-refusal-to-unlock-iphones","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/decrypting-apples-refusal-to-unlock-iphones\/","title":{"rendered":"Decrypting Apple\u2019s Refusal to Unlock iPhones"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Recently, Apple has again faced scrutiny by\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2020\/01\/14\/796160524\/apple-declines-doj-request-to-unlock-pensacola-gunmans-phones\">the DOJ<\/a>and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/twitter.com\/realDonaldTrump\/status\/1217228960964038658\">even our president<\/a>for their adamant refusal to unlock their customers\u2019 iPhones upon government request. In response to the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/news\/us-news\/pensacola-naval-base-shooting-act-terrorism-attorney-general-barr-says-n1114626\">Pensacola shooting<\/a>, where an Air Force cadet killed three sailors and wounded eight, the DOJ again\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.buzzfeednews.com\/article\/scottlucas\/william-barr-apple-request-unlock-iphones\">seeks Apple\u2019s assistance<\/a>in unlocking a shooter\u2019s iPhone. While Apple complied with many requests for assistance by law enforcement, the tech giant seems reluctant to comply fully. In response to Attorney General Barr\u2019s requests to unlock the Pensacola shooter\u2019s iPhone, Apple\u2019s\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.buzzfeednews.com\/article\/scottlucas\/william-barr-apple-request-unlock-iphones\">public statement<\/a>is informative of their intent.\u00a0Apple echoed its past stances on privacy, claiming that doing so would require the creation of a backdoor into the phone\u2019s encryption. In creating a backdoor,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.buzzfeednews.com\/article\/scottlucas\/william-barr-apple-request-unlock-iphones\">Apple voiced concern<\/a>of how it would jeopardize its customers\u2019 privacy if that backdoor fell into nefarious hands. Taking those statements into account, it appears that Apple will respond similarly today as they have in the past \u2013 and refuse.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0In 2016,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/theintercept.com\/2016\/02\/23\/new-court-filing-reveals-apple-faces-12-other-requests-to-break-into-locked-iphones\/\">Apple faced requests from the DOJ<\/a>to unlock San Bernardino shooter Farook\u2019s iPhone.\u00a0\u00a0In response, Apple released a\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/customer-letter\/\">public letter<\/a>to its customers, overtly refusing to comply. In that letter, Apple CEO Tim Cook emphasized a few concerns on their end. First,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/customer-letter\/\">Cook articulated the need for encryption<\/a>. Because iPhones are an essential part of many Americans\u2019 lives, they tend to contain enormous amounts of sensitive, personal information. To protect that information, Apple must heavily encrypt that data as to safeguard it from hackers and otherwise unsavory characters seeking access. Second, to unlock the shooter\u2019s iPhone<a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/customer-letter\/\">, Apple claimed<\/a>that it would be forced to create software that has the potential to unlock\u00a0<em>any<\/em>iPhone.\u00a0Pre-empting responses to their refusal, Cook explained that\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.apple.com\/customer-letter\/\">building a backdoor for just one iPhone is far from a clean-cut solution<\/a>. Because iPhones are similarly encrypted, a key to that encryption would function similarly on all phones, amounting to a massive security compromise.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The disagreement between the DOJ and Apple in regard to how our society should handle encryption, and by extension electronic privacy, is an emblematic one. On one hand, the DOJ represents the interests of law enforcement, and the government at large. A backdoor would allow for freer access of information to law enforcement, enabling them to ostensibly conduct more accurate investigations. Further, wider access to information may lead to acquittal of innocent defendants in cases where that data can be used to exonerate them. On the other hand, Apple\u2019s concern is mainly of privacy. Even when encryption is present, massive data leaks from prominent institutions such as\u00a0<a href=\"\/www.cbsnews.com\/news\/millions-facebook-user-records-exposed-amazon-cloud-server\/be\">Facebook<\/a>and\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ftc.gov\/enforcement\/cases-proceedings\/refunds\/equifax-data-breach-settlement\">Equifax<\/a>still occur. If these leaks can occur, encryption notwithstanding, would creating software that could access encrypted iPhones only serve to increase vulnerability?\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The questions that arise from the push-pull between consumer privacy and the interests of law enforcement have no easy answers. If left up to the courts, it\u2019s unclear how fruitful a court order requiring Apple to decrypt the Pensacola\u2019s phone would be. In the case of the San Bernardino shooter,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/2020\/01\/14\/796160524\/apple-declines-doj-request-to-unlock-pensacola-gunmans-phones\">Apple outright refused to comply<\/a>, defying the court\u2019s order.\u00a0\u00a0In the end, the government wound up working with a third-party contractor to get into the phone. As high-profile cases involving Apple\u2019s refusal to decrypt its phones stack up, pressure will continue to build upon Congress to act. Mandating that phone manufacturers include backdoors for the United States government is an option, but one that will be met with heavy resistance from Silicon Valley. However, the current state of affairs allows companies such as Apple to openly defy the government\u2019s requests for decryption without any serious consequences \u2013 a far from ideal approach.<\/p>\n\n\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0One potential solution is for Congress to create a system by which technology companies can obtain a criminal\u2019s phone from law enforcement, decrypt that phone at their facilities, then relay pertinent information to relevant parties. This way, any information related to the decryption would remain in-house, and law enforcement would be able to proceed with pressing matters in a more informed way. To ensure that this system isn\u2019t abused, Congress would have to set a threshold of criminal offenses that allows for investigations to pursue decryption in this manner.\u00a0Ultimately, the resolution of this question will likely involve some level of sacrifice. In reaching a compromise between consumer privacy and the government\u2019s access to information, one of the two values will likely have to give.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n<p>Stefan Maletic<\/p>\n\n\n<p>January 16, 2020<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Recently, Apple has again faced scrutiny by\u00a0the DOJand\u00a0even our presidentfor their adamant refusal to unlock their customers\u2019 iPhones upon government request. In response to the\u00a0Pensacola shooting, where an Air Force cadet killed three sailors and wounded eight, the DOJ again\u00a0seeks Apple\u2019s assistancein unlocking a shooter\u2019s iPhone. While Apple complied with many requests for assistance by <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/decrypting-apples-refusal-to-unlock-iphones\/\" class=\"more-link\">&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6542,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[51],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6541"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6541"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6541\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6784,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6541\/revisions\/6784"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6542"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6541"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6541"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6541"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}