{"id":6251,"date":"2019-04-03T14:06:01","date_gmt":"2019-04-03T14:06:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ncjolt.org\/?p=6251"},"modified":"2020-10-15T14:29:53","modified_gmt":"2020-10-15T14:29:53","slug":"knight-institute-v-trump-is-president-trumps-personal-twitter-account-subject-to-the-first-amendment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/knight-institute-v-trump-is-president-trumps-personal-twitter-account-subject-to-the-first-amendment\/","title":{"rendered":"Knight Institute v. Trump: Is President Trump\u2019s Personal Twitter Account Subject to the First Amendment?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Twitter has undoubtedly\nbeen a hegemon amongst social media platforms, particularly because it is a\nplatform used by some of the world\u2019s most influential people and companies. The\ngovernment, and President Trump, is no exception, as President Trump uses his\npersonal Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump to make comments, statements, and\ndirect questions to the public. <\/p>\n\n\n<p>The\nKnight First Amendment Institute filed suit in the Southern District of New\nYork, claiming that President Trump unconstitutionally blocked several people\nfrom the @realDonaldTrump account. The account blockage means that those\nprivate citizens who wish to see or reply to the President\u2019s Tweets cannot do\nso, and those citizens would be unable to see the Tweets of other private\ncitizens who reply to President Trump\u2019s Tweets. The suit alleges that President\nTrump, through his personal Twitter account, blocked those private persons because\nthey criticized the President and his <a href=\"https:\/\/knightcolumbia.org\/content\/knight-institute-v-trump-lawsuit-challenging-president-trumps-blocking-critics-twitter\">policies<\/a>.\nThe basis for the suit stems from a First Amendment claim\u2014that the government cannot\nengage in viewpoint discrimination in a \u201cpublic forum\u201d without meeting strict <a href=\"https:\/\/www.documentcloud.org\/documents\/3892615-Knight-First-Amendment-Institute-vs-Trump\">scrutiny<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Supreme Court of the United States has defined a public\nforum as governmental property that \u201chas immemorially been held in trust for\nthe use of the public.\u201d <em>Perry Educ. Ass\u2019n\nv. Perry Local Educators\u2019 Ass\u2019n<\/em>. Traditional public forums have been areas\nsuch as sidewalks or public <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2018\/05\/what-the-realdonaldtrump-ruling-actually-means\/561146\/\">parks<\/a>.\nHowever, can the President\u2019s Twitter account be said to constitute governmental\nproperty? Can the account be said to constitute governmental property that has\nimmemorially been used for the public? Because of Twitter\u2019s relative recency as\na communicative platform, and the fact that Twitter itself is a private\ncompany, these questions can be difficult to answer. But, they likely need not\nbe answered because even if President Trump\u2019s Twitter account was not deemed a\npublic forum, it may likely be deemed a \u201cdesignated public forum\u201d and must\nstill meet the same strict scrutiny standard. <\/p>\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Designated public forums are areas typically not open for the public but were made open to the public for the expression of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2018\/05\/what-the-realdonaldtrump-ruling-actually-means\/561146\/\">ideas<\/a>. This definition gets around the problem with the \u201cpublic forum\u201d definition, because it does not matter whether Twitter or the President\u2019s Twitter account is governmental property. Instead, the question is simply: Did the government designate or <em>use<\/em> Twitter as a place for expression to and from the public? The Southern District Court of New York answered yes. It found President Trump\u2019s Twitter account to be a designated public forum, and although the appeal is pending, it held that the President violated the First Amendment in its actions to block several Twitter accounts from accessing his <a href=\"https:\/\/globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu\/cases\/knight-first-amendment-institute-v-donald-j-trump\/\">page<\/a>. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; If President Trump\u2019s personal Twitter account is deemed a designated public forum, then the President and his communications team must act cautiously when making new attempts to block Twitter users from accessing the President\u2019s Twitter page. The government must meet strict scrutiny, meaning that the blockage of accounts must serve a \u201ccompelling state interest\u201d and is \u201cnarrowly tailored\u201d to achieve that state interest. Courts do not typically find compelling state interests unless safety is a major concern. Is it really a compelling state interest to block a few Twitter users from talking to the President? And, even if the government can successfully claim a compelling state interest, there may have been less restrictive ways to meet the alleged interest. For example, the government could have communicated with Twitter\u2019s regulatory team to provide warnings to the Twitter users who the President felt offended by. <\/p>\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote\"><p>Ultimately, President Trump will need to tread lightly on social media <\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n<p>Carlos Zapata, 3 April 2019.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Twitter has undoubtedly been a hegemon amongst social media platforms, particularly because it is a platform used by some of the world\u2019s most influential people and companies. The government, and President Trump, is no exception, as President Trump uses his personal Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump to make comments, statements, and direct questions to the public. The <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/knight-institute-v-trump-is-president-trumps-personal-twitter-account-subject-to-the-first-amendment\/\" class=\"more-link\">&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6252,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[51],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6251"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6251"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6251\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6824,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6251\/revisions\/6824"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6252"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6251"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6251"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6251"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}