{"id":3420,"date":"2015-04-01T20:28:15","date_gmt":"2015-04-01T20:28:15","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/ncjolt.org\/?p=3420"},"modified":"2020-06-04T20:53:37","modified_gmt":"2020-06-04T20:53:37","slug":"grady-v-north-carolina-what-does-it-mean-for-states-who-monitor-convicted-sex-offenders","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/grady-v-north-carolina-what-does-it-mean-for-states-who-monitor-convicted-sex-offenders\/","title":{"rendered":"Grady v. North Carolina: What Does It Mean For States Who Monitor Convicted Sex Offenders?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>On Monday, March 30, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued a <a href=\"http:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/14pdf\/14-593_o7jq.pdf\">ruling<\/a> that satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.\u00a0 The case, <em>Torrey Dale Grady v. North Carolina<\/em>, was brought by petitioner, Grady, who was convicted of two sexual offenses, one in 1997 and one in 2006.\u00a0 After serving his sentence, the state attempted to subject him to a satellite-based monitoring (SBM) system as authorized by <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ncleg.net\/EnactedLegislation\/Statutes\/HTML\/BySection\/Chapter_14\/GS_14-208.40.html\">North Carolina law<\/a>.\u00a0 This monitoring program would track Grady\u2019s location at all times and report violations of any schedule or location requirements.<br \/>\nThe <a href=\"http:\/\/constitutioncenter.org\/constitution\/the-amendments\">Fourth Amendment<\/a> to the United States Constitution guarantees \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d \u00a0When the Constitution was first written, it was much easier to determine when a search occurred and when one did not.\u00a0 If there was a government official searching through one\u2019s things or patting down one\u2019s clothes, it seems more obvious that there was a search occurring.\u00a0 However, with the advancement of technology, especially global positioning system (GPS) technology, courts are having to handle more cases where determining whether a search occurred is more ambiguous.<br \/>\nA landmark case concerning whether GPS tracking is considered a search is <a href=\"http:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/11pdf\/10-1259.pdf\"><em>United States v. Jones<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0 In this case, a GPS tracking device was attached to petitioner\u2019s car without a valid warrant for the purposes of discovering information to help the government investigate petitioner\u2019s drug trafficking activities.\u00a0 The Court held that the installation of a GPS tracking device onto petitioner\u2019s car for the purpose of obtaining information was clearly a search under the Fourth Amendment.<br \/>\nGiven the Court\u2019s emphasis on the attachment of a GPS tracking device on an individual\u2019s car being a search because of the intrusion onto that individual\u2019s property, it is unsurprising that the Court ruled the way it did in <em>Grady. <\/em>\u00a0In <em>Jones<\/em>, the Court stated that protection of property from unreasonable searches is one of the key aspects of the Fourth Amendment. Otherwise, \u201cthe phrase \u2018in their persons, houses, papers, and effects\u2019 would have been superfluous.\u201d\u00a0 An analogous argument can be made in <em>Grady<\/em>.\u00a0 The Fourth Amendment certainly meant to protect persons from unreasonable searches.\u00a0 Otherwise, the first part of the Fourth Amendment, \u201cThe right of the people to be secure in their persons,\u201d would have no meaning.\u00a0 If monitoring an individual\u2019s whereabouts by attaching a GPS device to his or her car is considered a search, it follows that monitoring an individual\u2019s whereabouts by attaching a GPS device to his or her body would also be considered a search.<br \/>\nAlthough the Court ruled in <em>Grady<\/em> that attaching a SBM system onto a person\u2019s body was considered a search, it explicitly stated that it was not making a ruling about whether the entire system of monitoring sex offenders was unconstitutional.\u00a0 Because the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, the state could still make an argument that monitoring sex offenders\u2019 locations constitutes a reasonable search.\u00a0 The purpose of ordering a recidivist sex offender to wear a SBM system is to protect its citizens and the state has an interest in protecting human life.\u00a0 However, even in enacting policies that are intended to protect the community, there are limitations on how far the state can intrude into one person\u2019s life.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>It will be interesting to see whether North Carolina will be able to justify its lifetime, continuous search of Grady on remand.\u00a0 If not, over <a href=\"http:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/nation\/2015\/03\/30\/supreme-court-sex-offender-gps\/70544348\/\">forty states<\/a> that have statutes authorizing GPS monitoring of sex offenders may see increased challenges to their statutes and may be required to redraft or repeal their laws.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On Monday, March 30, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued a ruling that satellite-based monitoring of sex offenders is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.\u00a0 The case, Torrey Dale Grady v. North Carolina, was brought by petitioner, Grady, who was convicted of two sexual offenses, one in 1997 and one in 2006.\u00a0 After <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/blogs\/grady-v-north-carolina-what-does-it-mean-for-states-who-monitor-convicted-sex-offenders\/\" class=\"more-link\">&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3421,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[51],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3420"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3420"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3420\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7348,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3420\/revisions\/7348"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3421"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3420"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3420"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/ncjolt\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3420"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}