**Will Haiti Every Stop Suffering? UN Security Council Shuts Down Talks of Peacekeeping**

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As a direct response to the exponential increase in violence perpetrated by Haitian gangs, the United Nations Security Council (hereinafter “Security Council”) licensed a Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission for an initial period of one year on October 2, 2023.[[1]](#endnote-1) This resolution amongst denouncing and condemning the violence occurring in Haiti, called for voluntary contributions by member states of personnel, equipment and other logistical and financial needs.[[2]](#endnote-2) All members of the Security Council voted to pass this resolution, with the exception of Russia and China, who expressed their concerns, including “that Chapter VII [of the UN Charter] was being invoked blindly” and that sending armed forces needed to be thought through. [[3]](#endnote-3)

The UN Charter grants the Security Council the primary responsibility of protecting and maintaining international peace and security.[[4]](#endnote-4) When there are actions that pertain to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, the Security Council can invoke Chapter VII to respond in a way that they deem appropriate to deal with the situation. This Chapter of the Charter is typically invoked to support the authorization of a peacekeeping operation. The UN follows three pillars when determining the creation of a Peacekeeping operation: consent, imperiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.[[5]](#endnote-5)

Attaining the consent of the parties is critical to the deployment of a peacekeeping operation as acceptance “provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.”[[6]](#endnote-6) Without it, peacekeepers can find themselves becoming targets in the conflict and or overall experiencing pushback from the parties.

Impartiality plays a role in maintaining consent and cooperation of the parties.[[7]](#endnote-7) Impartiality however means something other than indifference; it refers more to how they deal with the individual parties, not necessarily in the application of the mandate.

Lastly, the non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate highlights the traditional notion that the UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool.[[8]](#endnote-8) However, in high violence and unstable environments, the UN can issue a robust mandate which expands the scope of when force is allowed.

 However, a year later, despite Russia and China’s initial reservations, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2751 on September 30, 2024, in reaction to the violence and human rights violations being perpetrated against Haitian civilians exponentially increasing.[[9]](#endnote-9) Resolution 2751 authorized the extension of the Kenya-led mission for another year.[[10]](#endnote-10) During the drafting of Resolution 2751, the interim president of Haiti pled with the Security Council to transform the current mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping operation[[11]](#endnote-11) since, despite Kenya’s best efforts to thwart the current violence in Haiti, the mission was largely unsuccessful due to insufficient troops[[12]](#endnote-12) and limited funding.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Although fully within its authority under Chapter VII, the Security Council denied the request for transforming the Kenya-led operation into a peacekeeping operation. This is likely due to the UN’s strained relations with Haiti as a result of its previous disastrous missions and concerns that implementing the mission would be premature. After the last peacekeeping operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH, the UN faced great criticism for the way peacekeepers conducted themselves after the 2010 earthquake, facing sexual assault accusations[[14]](#endnote-14) and disparagement for their perpetration of the cholera outbreak.[[15]](#endnote-15) Additionally, China and Russia are adamant that the current mission should not be allowed to fully establish itself.[[16]](#endnote-16)They suggest that there are other ways to minimize the violence than sending in additional troops, such as counteracting the smuggling of American weapons entering the country.[[17]](#endnote-17)

However, if the Security Council decided to move forward despite these concerns, it would legally be able to do so as the situation meets the three requirements. Consent is met as the interim president of Haiti is requesting a mission, there would be impartiality as the primary concern is to stop human rights perpetrations against civilians, and force would be allowed in defense of the mandate.[[18]](#endnote-18)

As much as it appears that a peacekeeping operation would significantly benefit Haitian civilians, “we must remember the past to avoid making the same mistakes in the future. This is an opportunity to right past wrongs and restore the image of international missions in Haiti.”[[19]](#endnote-19) Therefore, despite the urgency of the situation on the ground, we must ensure that, if there is a new peacekeeping operation, it is executed carefully so that it can have the highest likelihood of success. The Haitian people deserve a real chance and peace.

1. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes Multinational Security Mission for Haiti for Initial Period of One Year, by Vote of 13 in Favour with 2 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/15432 (Oct. 2, 2023). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. *Id*. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. *Id*. at para. 9. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. U.N. Charter art. 1 ¶ 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. United Nations Peacekeeping, *Principles of Peacekeeping,* <https://perma.cc/7DPH-7L7W> (last visited Oct. 26, 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. *Id.* [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. *Id*. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. *Id.* [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Press Release, Security Council, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2751 (2024), Security Council Extends Authorization for Kenya-Led Security Support Mission in Haiti for One year, U.N. Press Release SC/15838 (Sept. 30, 2024). The fact that there were no reservations made by Russia or China speaks to the level of atrocities being committed by the gangs in Haiti. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. *Id*. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. *Id.* para 1. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Harold Issac & Pascal Fletcher, *Kenyan police taunted as they squad up to Haiti’s gangs*, BBC (Aug. 9, 2024), <https://perma.cc/V6MP-65AD>. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Human Rights Watch, *World Leaders Should Stand up for Haiti*, Human Rights Watch (Sept. 23, 2024), <https://perma.cc/B4WX-FD2R>. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. *See* Skye Wheeler, *UN Peacekeeping has a Sexual Abuse Problem,* Human Rights Watch (Jan. 11, 2020, 3:00 PM), <https://perma.cc/RMX4-R7EH>. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Jemima Pierre, *Cholera, Colonization, and Militarized Humanitarianism in Haiti*, Society for Cultural Anthropology (Jan. 25, 2022),[**https://perma.cc/B2WY-JDEN**](https://perma.cc/B2WY-JDEN)**.** [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. UN Extends Haiti security mission for another year as violence soars, Aljazeera, <https://perma.cc/GNG6-NLZD> (last visited Oct. 26, 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Explanation of the vote by Deputy Permanent Representative Dmitry polyanskiy after the UNSC vote on a draft resolution on the extension of the mandate of the MSS Mission in Haiti, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United States, <https://perma.cc/4BGY-FBN2>(last visited Oct, 26, 2024). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. This would be assuming that the mandate given would be robust, therefore the situations in which force would be allowed is broader. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Remarks Following the Adoption of a UNSC Resolution Renewing the Haiti Multinational Security Support Mission, U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Oct. 2, 2023), <https://perma.cc/3DQN-FKWW>. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)