{"id":453,"date":"2026-11-11T15:18:34","date_gmt":"2026-11-11T15:18:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/?p=453"},"modified":"2026-11-11T15:21:37","modified_gmt":"2026-11-11T15:21:37","slug":"anonymous-calls-and-unlawful-stops-reasonable-person-standards-for-searches-and-seizures","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/2026\/11\/anonymous-calls-and-unlawful-stops-reasonable-person-standards-for-searches-and-seizures\/","title":{"rendered":"Anonymous Calls and Unlawful Stops: Reasonable Person Standards for Searches and Seizures"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>Imagine you are sitting in your parked car, talking to your friends, when two police cars drive up behind you. When they see you, they stop their cars abruptly so that you are blocked into your parking space. You could maybe drive around them if you did a three-point turn, but you have always heard you are not supposed to run away from the police. Would you try and get away?&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/244512.P.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>United States v. Williams<\/em><\/a>, the Fourth Circuit recently held<em> <\/em>that when police \u201cblock in\u201d an individual\u2019s parked car with patrol vehicles, that constitutes a seizure because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Additionally, the Court evaluated whether an anonymous 911 call and a suspect\u2019s presence in a \u201chigh crime area\u201d are sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion for a seizure, finding they are not.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Background<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Kevin Williams and two of his friends were hanging out in an apartment complex parking lot in Mr. Williams\u2019s white Mercedes sedan when an anonymous caller dialed 911. The caller reported the white Mercedes and a \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/244512.P.pdf#page=2\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">light-brown-skinned male with either twists or dreads\u201d as \u201cpossibly selling narcotics.<\/a>\u201d The caller did not provide any specifics beyond that description. Officers Pistone and Wilson of Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police were assigned to respond and drove to the apartment complex, where they saw Mr. Williams\u2019s white Mercedes. Pistone immediately stopped his vehicle perpendicular to the Mercedes, blocking it from the front. Wilson stopped his vehicle behind Pistone\u2019s. The Mercedes was already blocked from the back, as it was parked against the curb. The officers got out of their vehicles and quickly smelled marijuana, which they believed came from the Mercedes. Mr. Williams admitted to smoking marijuana, and the officers then requested that he and the other passengers exit the vehicle. Upon searching the vehicle, the officers found a gun, which Mr. Williams also admitted was his. Due to a prior conviction, Mr. Williams was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At trial, Mr. Williams moved to suppress the evidence found during the search, arguing that the officers seized him without reasonable suspicion when they blocked in his car. The trial court denied Mr. Williams\u2019s motion and he was later convicted. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit asked two questions: first, whether the officers seized Mr. Williams the moment they stopped their vehicles in the roadway, and second, whether the 911 call provided the officers with reasonable suspicion that allowed them to seize Mr. Williams.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Parking Job<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Writing for the majority, Judge Benjamin ruled that under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had seized Mr. Williams. First, a reasonable person physically blocked in by police cars would not feel free to leave. While someone could argue that Mr. Williams could have maneuvered around the cars, he would have had to risk escalating the situation with the officers and potentially facing violence. There was not enough room for him to drive away freely, which created the presumption that he was not allowed to leave. Second, the officers\u2019 conduct in and of itself signaled to Mr. Williams that he was the subject of an investigation. The officers entered the parking lot in their police vehicles and upon seeing his white Mercedes, immediately stopped, parked their cars, and approached him. In their analysis, the Court heavily weighed what a reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances would think.\u00a0 In this case, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave police presence while effectively being barricaded in his parking spot by a curb and police vehicles.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The 911 Call<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement to conduct brief searches when an officer has \u201c<a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.ca4.uscourts.gov\/opinions\/244512.P.pdf#page=2\" target=\"_blank\">reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.<\/a>\u201d In this case, the anonymous 911 call did not allege specific, credible facts of drug dealing that could be corroborated by police, such as individuals approaching the car and making transactions. Nor was there a clear and present dangerous situation that would justify immediate police intervention, <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/pdf\/12-9490.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">like a drunk driver running a car off the road.<\/a> The caller only specified the car and perceived the race and gender of the person he suspected to be committing a crime with no further context. With this sparse, unsubstantiated information there was no way for law enforcement to properly assess the reliability of the call. Nor did the apartment complex\u2019s status as a high-crime area justify a finding of reasonable suspicion, which the Court viewed as a weak factor in its analysis. Even when the Court considered these two factors of the call and the high-crime area together, the vagueness of the call and its lack of substantive allegations of criminal activity were not enough to generate reasonable suspicion. Without reasonable suspicion, the officers\u2019 seizure of Mr. Williams and subsequent search of his vehicle were unlawful, and their fruits could not be used in court. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial court\u2019s decision and vacated Mr. Williams\u2019s conviction.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Implications<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This clarification of Fourth Amendment protections regarding reasonable suspicion and seizure is good news for Fourth Circuit residents everywhere, especially for those living in overpoliced communities. Simply being in a high-crime area is not, and should not, be incriminating without other supporting factors. Simply being parked in a particular apartment complex, driving a certain car, or being Black are not good enough reasons to override the most fundamental constitutional protections against intrusive law enforcement practices.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Ashley Logue<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Class of 2028, Staff Member<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Imagine you are sitting in your parked car, talking to your friends, when two police cars drive up behind you. When they see you, they stop their cars abruptly so that you are blocked into your parking space. You could maybe drive around them if you did a three-point turn, but you have always heard <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/2026\/11\/anonymous-calls-and-unlawful-stops-reasonable-person-standards-for-searches-and-seizures\/\" class=\"more-link\">&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[9],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/453"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=453"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/453\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":455,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/453\/revisions\/455"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=453"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=453"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=453"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}