{"id":335,"date":"2025-01-07T17:57:40","date_gmt":"2025-01-07T17:57:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/?p=335"},"modified":"2025-01-07T17:57:40","modified_gmt":"2025-01-07T17:57:40","slug":"alabamas-ivf-ban-and-the-broadening-definition-of-children","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/2025\/01\/alabamas-ivf-ban-and-the-broadening-definition-of-children\/","title":{"rendered":"Alabama’s IVF Ban and the Broadening Definition of “Children”"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the U.S., the definition of the word \u201cchild\u201d often varies given the legal context. Lawyers who deal with wills typically use the word in its everyday meaning<\/a> and consider any and all living offspring of a testator to be a child when they are divvying up an estate. In contrast, immigration lawyers<\/a> may use the term \u201cchildren\u201d to refer to a person\u2019s unmarried offspring who are younger than twenty-one. Both of these definitions assume that the child has already been born in order for them to be considered in any legal context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since the overturn of<\/a> Roe v. <\/em><\/a>Wade<\/em><\/a>, states have the unadulterated power to define what a child is in the context of \u201cpersonhood\u201d legislation; i.e., laws defining the parameters of what counts as a living human being. Because states across the country have such drastically different stances on abortion, their reproductive laws contain drastically different ideas of what exactly a \u201cchild\u201d<\/a> is. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In an almost unanimous decision earlier this year, the Alabama Supreme Court declared that any human embryo created by invitro-fertilization is legally a \u201cchild.\u201d The recent ruling is representative of a growing trend among states, especially in the South<\/a>, to enact personhood laws that construe the definition of \u201cchildren\u201d to include fetuses, in order to criminalize abortion. Alabama, however, has upped the ante by making it illegal in the state to bring about the destruction of human embryos, even if they have not yet been implanted inside a womb. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Alabama ruling marked a startling precedent and may influence other states to adopt radical personhood laws that broaden the scope of what a \u201cchild\u201d is. Embryos are the foundation of the assisted reproductive technology (ART) <\/a>that helps couples who cannot conceive on their own. If more states redefine \u201cchildren\u201d in their statutes to include embryos, thousands of people living in the Southern U.S. may lose their most viable option for creating a family.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Alabama Supreme Court\u2019s Definition of \u201cChildren\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2020, a patient at an Alabama fertility clinic opened a storage container containing human embryos and accidentally destroyed them<\/a>. Three of the couples whose embryos were destroyed brought suit against the clinic under the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. A trial court dismissed the couples\u2019 claims on the basis that the frozen embryos did not fall within the definition of a \u201cchild.\u201d However, this decision was reversed by the Alabama Supreme Court, which held that the loss of the embryos was the legal equivalent of killing the couples\u2019 children. In an 8-to-1 opinion, the Court broadened the definition of \u201cchild to include \u201cunborn children without limitation \u2026 [including] unborn children who are not located in utero at the time they are killed.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Court cited the state\u2019s constitution<\/a>, as well as a statute created over a hundred years before the invention of IVF, as the basis for its ruling. Religion also played a heavy hand<\/a> <\/a>in the court\u2019s decision-making: \u201c[H]uman life cannot be wrongly destroyed without incurring the wrath of a holy God, who views the destruction of His image as an affront to Himself\u2026.\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Potential Implications for Thousands of Southern Families<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It seems like the ruling of the Alabama Supreme Court has inspired nearby states\u2019 views on the issue of personhood. There has been a noticeable influx of courts across the country that have upheld similar definitions of \u201cchildren,\u201d especially in the South<\/a>. Like the Alabama Supreme Court, many of these opinions cite religious text as evidence <\/a>in favor of stricter interpretations of \u201cchild.\u201d The judges who make these decisions are almost certainly drawing from their own religious values, ensuring that the law does not challenge their personal ideologies<\/a>. This trend in court rulings is incredibly unfair for people across the region who hold different religious beliefs and have no other alternative for having children.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In states that have already imposed nearly impenetrable blockades on abortion access<\/a>, there is a risk that their courts will begin to broaden the definition of \u201cchild\u201d to include embryos for religious reasons. Couples in North Carolina, where abortion is banned after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy<\/a>, may find themselves with one less option to make their dreams of having their own family a reality<\/a>. If the North Carolina Supreme Court were to ever uphold a similar ruling, medical professionals working in IVF treatment would likely face legal ramifications <\/a>for providing this vital service to families and would have to close their clinics. Such a tragic situation is increasingly likely in the wake of Alabama\u2019s ruling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Caitlyn Tillett<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Class of 2026, Staff Member<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction In the U.S., the definition of the word \u201cchild\u201d often varies given the legal context. Lawyers who deal with wills typically use the word in its everyday meaning and consider any and all living offspring of a testator to be a child when they are divvying up an estate. In contrast, immigration lawyers may use the term \u201cchildren\u201d …<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[9],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/335"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=335"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/335\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":336,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/335\/revisions\/336"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=335"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=335"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/nccivilrightslaw\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=335"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}