{"id":5603,"date":"2026-01-21T03:09:09","date_gmt":"2026-01-21T03:09:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/?p=5603"},"modified":"2026-01-21T03:09:09","modified_gmt":"2026-01-21T03:09:09","slug":"chiles-v-salazar-therapeutic-conversation-or-conversion-therapy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/chiles-v-salazar-therapeutic-conversation-or-conversion-therapy\/","title":{"rendered":"Chiles v. Salazar:\u00a0Therapeutic Conversation or Conversion Therapy?\u00a0"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By: Sybil Sides<\/a>, Vol. 24 Staff Writer<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What\u2019s\u00a0the 411?\u00a0<\/strong>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On October 7th<\/sup>, 2025, the Supreme Court heard\u00a0oral arguments<\/a>\u00a0for the case of\u00a0Chiles v. Salazar<\/em><\/a>.\u00a0\u00a0Kaley Chiles, a licensed counselor in Colorado, provides talk-therapy to minors and often uses her Christian faith in her practice.\u00a0\u00a0Chiles\u00a0contends<\/a>\u00a0that many of her clients seek Christian-based counseling to quash unwanted sexual attractions and to become content with their biological sex.\u00a0\u00a0Some of Chiles\u2019 clients come from church referrals, specifically to \u201cprioritize<\/a>\u00a0their faith above their feelings.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2019, Colorado passed a Counseling Restriction that prohibits the kind of talk-therapy that Chiles\u2019 clients are\u00a0alleged<\/a>\u00a0to have sought out.\u00a0\u00a0The\u00a0Minor Conversion Therapy Law<\/a>\u00a0(MCTL) prohibits professionals like Chiles from providing treatment to minors that\u00a0attempts\u00a0to change sexual orientation or gender identity.\u00a0\u00a0Violation of the law could result in board disciplinary action.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This has led to the issue that is now before the Supreme Court:\u00a0whether Colorado\u2019s law is a regulation of a counselor\u2019s conduct or a First Amendment violation of the Freedom of Speech Clause.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Talking Points\u00a0<\/strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On appeal from the district court\u2019s decision in favor of the State, the\u00a0Tenth Circuit<\/a>\u00a0agreed that speech affected by the MCTL is only incidental to the conduct that it is regulating.\u00a0\u00a0Applying the rational-basis test, the Tenth Circuit\u00a0concluded<\/a>\u00a0that the MCTL regulates the medical conduct of professionals that provide healthcare treatment and rejected Chiles\u2019 argument that her counseling is \u201cnot medical\u00a0at all\u201d but\u00a0instead involve\u00a0\u201cclient-directed\u201d conversations.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Upholding\u00a0the MCTL, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit\u2019s view,\u00a0resulting in a\u00a0circuit\u00a0split\u00a0with the Eleventh and Third Circuits.\u00a0\u00a0The Ninth Circuit previously\u00a0held<\/a>\u00a0that regulations banning talk therapy do not pose any constitutional infringement on speech. By viewing the issue\u00a0on a continuum, the Ninth Circuit found that \u201csexual orientation change efforts<\/a>\u201d therapy fell on the end of professional misconduct.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chiles, however, urges the Supreme Court to adopt the\u00a0Eleventh\u00a0and Third Circuit\u2019s holdings thus requiring talk therapy to be treated as speech falling within First Amendment protections.\u00a0\u00a0The\u00a0Eleventh Circuit<\/a>\u00a0resolved the content-based-or-not\u00a0question as an \u201ceasy\u201d one: conversion therapy bans are subject to strict scrutiny \u201cbecause the ordinances depend on what is said[.]\u201d\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where the Conversation Left Off<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At oral argument, some Justices\u00a0appeared to have\u00a0differing concerns about the proper standard to be applied.\u00a0\u00a0Justice Jackson\u00a0noted<\/a>\u00a0that it would be odd to allow different medical professionals to treat the same condition with different treatments, yet one would be subject to different constitutional protections.\u00a0Additionally, she\u00a0noted that\u00a0there\u00a0certainly\u00a0must be\u00a0evidence conversion therapy is harmful considering that 25 other states have passed similar laws to Colorado\u2019s.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chile\u2019s counsel argues however, that the studies\u00a0lump<\/a>\u00a0shock therapy with voluntary conversations. Justice Sotomayer seemed to suggest that the studies may not be necessary to overcome\u00a0a strict\u00a0scrutiny analysis.\u00a0\u00a0She\u00a0posed<\/a>\u00a0the example that a study would not be necessary if states told dietitians not to \u201cencourage anorexic patients to engage in more restricted eating.\u201d\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Justice Alito\u00a0questioned<\/a>\u00a0whether ideology has\u00a0perhaps infiltrated\u00a0medical consensus and cited an era where medical professionals believed children with Down Syndrome should be institutionalized after birth. Similarly, Counsel for the Trump Administration\u00a0argued<\/a>\u00a0that strict scrutiny was the proper measure because \u201cthe law restricts speech based on content and viewpoint.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Justice Alito\u2019s comment suggested the familiar sentiment as the Eleventh Circuit\u2019s opinion noting the dangers of content regulation by citing\u00a0NIFLA<\/em><\/a>: \u201c[a]s with other kinds of speech, regulating the content of professionals\u2019 speech poses the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Implications<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Upholding the ban on conversion therapy could allow the states \u201cto\u00a0interfere<\/a>\u00a0with\u00a0[]\u00a0conversations between professionals and their clients\u201d based\u00a0off of\u00a0what the state views as unsafe.\u00a0\u00a0This poses the question:\u00a0if a legislature is majorly composed of people that view abortion as unsafe,\u00a0is it possible that upholding the ban would allow for a regulation of talk-therapy that encourages\u00a0terminating\u00a0a pregnancy\u00a0regardless of the client\u2019s wishes?\u00a0\u00a0Counsel for Chiles\u00a0urged<\/a>\u00a0the Supreme Court to apply heightened scrutiny because, if not, \u201cstates can transform counselors into mouthpieces for the government.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conversely,\u00a0barring regulation on talk-therapy would limit states ability to \u201censure<\/a>\u00a0mental healthcare professionals comply with the standard of care.\u201d\u00a0\u00a0This poses another question:\u00a0could barring regulation potentially enable mental health counselors to freely impose their personal beliefs on minors regardless of a client\u2019s circumstances?\u00a0\u00a0For example, could a counselor who vehemently opposed divorce\u00a0discourage\u00a0a client from leaving an abusive spouse?\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hopefully\u00a0the Supreme Court will shed light on some of these competing concerns in their decision, which is\u00a0expected\u00a0by\u00a0summer of\u00a02026.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By: Sybil Sides, Vol. 24 Staff Writer What\u2019s\u00a0the 411?\u00a0\u00a0 On October 7th, 2025, the Supreme Court heard\u00a0oral arguments\u00a0for the case of\u00a0Chiles v. Salazar.\u00a0\u00a0Kaley Chiles, a licensed counselor in Colorado, provides talk-therapy to minors and often uses her Christian faith in her practice.\u00a0\u00a0Chiles\u00a0contends\u00a0that many of her clients seek Christian-based counseling to quash unwanted sexual attractions and …<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":5604,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[396,400],"tags":[133,152],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5603"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5603"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5603\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5605,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5603\/revisions\/5605"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5604"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5603"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5603"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5603"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}