{"id":2359,"date":"2018-11-07T10:29:23","date_gmt":"2018-11-07T15:29:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/?p=2359"},"modified":"2018-11-07T10:29:23","modified_gmt":"2018-11-07T15:29:23","slug":"not-peace-but-a-sword-janus-and-the-weaponizing-of-free-speech","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/not-peace-but-a-sword-janus-and-the-weaponizing-of-free-speech\/","title":{"rendered":"Not Peace, but a Sword: Janus and the weaponizing of free speech"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align:center\">By Daniel J. Root<\/p>\n<p><strong>The case and the controversy<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Last June, the Supreme Court in <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf\">Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31<\/a><\/em> overturned a forty-one-year-old precedent. At issue was whether public employees who are not union members can be required to pay union dues.<\/p>\n<p>Under <em><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/us-supreme-court\/431\/209.html\">Abood v. Detroit Board of Education<\/a><\/em>, non-union members could be required to pay fees necessary for the union\u2019s collective bargaining activities but not for the union\u2019s political activities. However, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=32\">according to the Janus Court<\/a> such a dichotomy is untenable. Collective bargaining for public employees is itself political, as it affects government spending.<\/p>\n<p>In <em>Janus<\/em> the Court <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=6\">ruled<\/a> that forcing nonmembers to pay fees is the same as \u201ccompelling [nonmembers] to subsidize private speech on matters <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=6\">of substantial public concern<\/a>.\u201d This practice therefore invokes First Amendment principles, which call for a minimum of \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=16\">exacting scrutiny<\/a>.\u201d The Court held under such scrutiny the rationales of <em>Abood<\/em> do not validate the requirement of such fees, force of precedent notwithstanding.<\/p>\n<p>What might otherwise seem a rather mundane workaday case, however, took on momentous significance due to Justice Kagan\u2019s dissent. In her dissent, Justice Kagan <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=82\">accused<\/a> the justices in the majority of \u201cturning the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against workaday economic policy.\u201d Under this newly \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=81\">weaponiz[ed]<\/a>\u201d First Amendment, in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=83\">her view<\/a>, \u201cat every stop are black-robed rulers overriding citizens\u2019 choices.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>According to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=83\">Kagan<\/a>, \u201c[t]he First Amendment was meant for better things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance.\u201d But this argument is contrary to the purpose of Constitutional rights.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Freedom or democracy?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Justice Kagan\u2019s dissent raises an existential question that any free society must answer: How can the freedom of the few be preserved against the will of the many?<\/p>\n<p>In America the tyranny of the majority is prevented through the judiciary\u2019s ability to override the will of the people when they go too far\u2014\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=53\">to withdraw<\/a> certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>As <a href=\"http:\/\/articles.latimes.com\/1992-01-12\/local\/me-358_1_jail-tax-individual-rights-san-diego\">Marvin Simkin<\/a> wrote, \u201cDemocracy is not freedom. Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to eat for lunch. Freedom comes from the recognition of certain rights which may not be taken, not even by a 99% vote.\u201d Constitutional rights ensure that political minorities\u2019 freedoms are \u201cnever . . . chipped away by the whim of the <a href=\"http:\/\/articles.latimes.com\/1992-01-12\/local\/me-358_1_jail-tax-individual-rights-san-diego\">majority<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/avalon.law.yale.edu\/18th_century\/fed78.asp\">The Framers intended<\/a> the \u201ccourts of justice . . . to be . . . the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments.\u201d <a href=\"http:\/\/oll.libertyfund.org\/titles\/tocqueville-democracy-in-america-historical-critical-edition-vol-2\">Tocqueville<\/a> writing in the 1830s lauded American courts for their ability \u201cto correct the errors of democracy.\u201d \u201c[W]ithout ever being able to stop the movements of the majority,\u201d <a href=\"http:\/\/oll.libertyfund.org\/titles\/tocqueville-democracy-in-america-historical-critical-edition-vol-2\">he wrote<\/a>, the courts \u201csucceed in slowing and directing\u201d the majority.<\/p>\n<p>Few rights are more sacred than those enshrined in the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=13\">both the right<\/a> to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.\u201d Additionally, the amendment protects \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=13\">[t]he right to eschew<\/a> association for expressive purposes.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Quoting Justice Jackson, the <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=13\">Janus Court affirmed<\/a><\/em> as a \u201cfixed star in our constitutional constellation\u201d the principle that the government cannot \u201cforce citizens to confess by word or act their faith\u201d in any prevailing political ideology. Thomas Jefferson went even further. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=14\">He wrote<\/a> that \u201cto compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The <em>Abood<\/em> Court did not deny the importance of the freedom of association. It merely sought to balance this right against <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=16\">public policy concerns<\/a>. The Court reached a compromise wherein nonmembers would only have to pay an \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=8\">agency fee<\/a>\u201d\u2014the percentage of full dues required to cover only the costs associated with collective bargaining.<\/p>\n<p>However, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=32\">the <em>Janus<\/em> Court found<\/a> this compromise failed to realize that even collective bargaining is political. The compensation of public employees affects the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=33\">state\u2019s budget<\/a>. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=34\">Collective bargaining affects<\/a> the compensation of public employees. Therefore, collective bargaining affects the state\u2019s budget, which is \u201ca matter of <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=32\">great public concern<\/a>.\u201d Agency fees thus fund political speech, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=37\">the Court found<\/a> no sufficient state interest to require nonmembers to pay.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Conclusion <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The overturning of a longstanding precedent cannot be viewed without some perturbation. In <em>Janus<\/em> the Supreme Court overturned a precedent that stood for forty-one years. If the Court overturned <em>Abood<\/em> (1977), could other precedents of that era (such as <em>Roe<\/em> (1973)) also be in jeopardy? However, predictions of this nature can rest on nothing but conjecture.<\/p>\n<p>Strong arguments exist in both the majority and the dissent of <em>Janus<\/em>. The justices had an unenviable task in deciding how to rule. The reasoning in <em>Abood<\/em> seems questionable at best. However, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=74\">stare decisis<\/a><\/em> dictates that the Court must \u201cstick[ ] to some wrong decisions.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Justice Kagan\u2019s dissent was carefully reasoned and erudite. But it went just a bit too far in its assessment of the purpose of the First Amendment. She <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=83\">wrote<\/a> the First Amendment \u201cwas meant not to undermine but to protect democratic governance.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>On the contrary, the First Amendment (and all constitutional rights for that matter) <em>is<\/em> meant to undermine democratic governance. The Court in <em>Janus<\/em> did not \u201cturn[ ] the First Amendment into a <a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/17pdf\/16-1466_2b3j.pdf#page=82\">sword<\/a>.\u201d It ever was a sword wielded on behalf of the politically weak against the tyranny of the majority.<\/p>\n<p>Whenever the majority\u2014by democratic vote\u2014impinges on the freedom of speech, the First Amendment shall bar the way. Indeed, the Framers gave us the First Amendment \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.kingjamesbibleonline.org\/Matthew-10-34\/\">not to send peace, but a sword.<\/a>\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Daniel J. Root The case and the controversy Last June, the Supreme Court in Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 overturned a forty-one-year-old precedent. At issue was whether public employees who are not union members can be required to pay union dues. Under Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, non-union members could be required to <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/not-peace-but-a-sword-janus-and-the-weaponizing-of-free-speech\/\" class=\"more-link\">&#8230;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":10,"featured_media":2358,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[5],"tags":[152,266,306,357,377],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2359"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/10"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2359"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2359\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2358"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2359"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2359"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.law.unc.edu\/firstamendmentlawreview\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2359"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}